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1 Introduction
Choosing the exchange rate regime for an open economy is one of the classic macroeco-
nomic problems. The conventional idea behind an exchange rate peg is that it will anchor
ination expectations and increase trade through lower uncertainty and smaller adjustment
costs. It may also encourage investment into long-term projects due to lower exchange rate
risk/ transaction costs and therefore has a positive economic impact (see e.g. Cote (1994)
and Prasad, Rogo¤, Wei, and Kose (2003) for the potential benets of xed exchange
rate regimes). However, being prone to speculative attacks hard pegs became less popu-
lar, especially after the Asian crisis of 1997. On the other hand recent evidence suggests
that monetary authorities in many developing countries still see targeting the nominal ex-
change as a priority, despite that they o¢ cially claim to have oating regimes.1 Developing
and emerging countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, Turkey, Russia
adopted de jure exible exchange rate regimes, but de facto the exchange rate remained
one of the most important if not the only target of their monetary policy in the post 1997
decade.2
Despite a relatively tranquil post-1997 decade in most developing and emerging coun-
tries, the exchange rate volatility under these soft pegsvaried over time. There is also
a number of studies that document di¢ culties in explaining sudden changes in regimes
between periods of high and low volatilities.3 Theoretical explanations for these di¤erent
regimes include non-rational behaviour, non-linear decisions or heterogeneity of agents like
1See e.g Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
2See Rahmatsyah, Rajaguru, and Siregar (2002) for Thailand, Dogolnar (2002) for Turkey, Korea,
Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan, and Arize, Osang, and Slottje (2000) for 13 developing countries.
Furthermore, evidence by Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) suggests that partial exchange rate targeting is still
the predominant monetary policy regime in many developing countries.
3See e.g. Engel and Hamilton (1990), Clarida et al. (2003) or Chen (2006) who apply Markov-switching
models to explain these changes. These models have also been employed to describe exchange rate be-
haviour in oating regimes. However, their success is still a matter of debate see e.g. again Clarida et al.
(2003) and Engel, Mark, and West (2007).
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the presence of noise traders(see Jeanne and Rose (2002) for an important example).
In this paper we o¤er a di¤erent theoretical approach which can contribute to the ex-
planation of these empirical observations. Using a simple small open economy model in the
spirit of Galí and Monacelli (2005) but with incomplete nancial markets we demonstrate
that the way monetary policy is conducted might be responsible for the existence of time
periods with large di¤erence in the volatility of all macroeconomic variables, including the
exchange rate.
Specically, we demonstrate that discretionary monetary policy may result in multiple
equilibria, consistent with di¤erent sets of beliefs of the private sector and the policymaker.
A discretionary policy maker takes current and future economic conditions into account,
but can only commit to current behavior. The current economic condition is a¤ected by
the past behaviour of the rational private sector which is again based on a forecast of
future economic conditions and future policy. As a consequence multiple equilibria may
arise: A policy maker responds to a state that is at least partly determined by forecasts
of his behaviour. Di¤erent sets of beliefs about the future policy generate di¤erent future
courses for a policy maker to follow. Therefore, if the economy is hit by a shock, it can
follow one of several adjustment paths, where the volatility along these paths is di¤erent,
resulting in di¤erent welfare outcomes.4
Once multiplicity of discretionary equilibria is a reality, coordination on the best equi-
librium may be di¢ cult. Discretionary policy is sequential: each period a new policymaker
arrives into o¢ ce, observes the current state and makes prediction which are consistent
with those of the private sector under the RE assumption about the policy of all future
policymakers. The policy is time-consistent by construction, so if the current policymaker
4The existence of multiple equilibria under discretionary policy in non-linear models has been well
established by King and Wolman (2004) and Albanesi et al. (2003). Blake and Kirsanova (2012) show that
multiplicity can also occur in LQ RE models under discretionary policy.
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perceives a particular even inferior policy of future policymakers, it will be optimal
for the policymaker to implement the same policy in the current period. A unilateral de-
viation of the current policymaker from the perceived policy plan is not benecial to this
policymaker, and the resulting discretionary policy is a Nash equilibrium in the game of
consequent policymakers, see e.g. (Oudiz and Sachs, 1985; Dennis and Kirsanova, 2017).
In other words, the existence of multiple equilibria implies that consequent policymakers
may fail to coordinate on the best equilibrium or, equivalently, fall into an expectation
trap.5
This paper compares and contrasts ination targeting with soft exchange rate targeting
under discretionary policy. Multiplicity arises in both cases. Under conventional ination
targeting the model has three stable discretionary equilibria. If the economy is hit by
a cost-push shock, in two of the three equilibria the monetary policy maker raises the
interest rate and reduces demand. Although the terms of trade improve, their positive
e¤ect on marginal costs is dominated by the e¤ect of lower demand. The private sector
reduces its holdings of net foreign assets creating a persistent decit. The decit and
all macroeconomic variables converge back to the steady state at a very slow rate. In
contrast, in the second equilibrium the cost push shock is initially accommodated, and
the large depreciation of the terms of trade causes the net foreign assets to accumulate.
Once the level of assets is high, the interest rate is raised and ination is brought back to
its base. This delayed increase in the interest rate also brings net foreign assets and all
macroeconomic variables back to the base line very quickly. In the presence of multiple
equilibria, a coordination failure occurs: the agents can choose any of them and a sunspot
decides which one will realise.
A similar coordination failure may also happen under soft exchange rate targeting,
5See Cooper and John (1988) for a detailed discussion about coordination failures and multiple equi-
libria.
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either partial or strict. The policy maker introduces an additional positive weight  in
otherwise standard policy objective that punishes the volatility of the nominal exchange
rate. There is still a conventional discretionary equilibrium in which the exchange rate
remains on target. However, as it is acceptable but costly that the future exchange rate
can deviate from the target, the economic agents may coordinate on the second admissible
equilibrium, in which the exchange rate is volatile around the target.
Our model abstracts from many features that may characterize developing countries,
e.g. capital controls or incomplete exchange rate pass-through. However, we show that the
assumption of incomplete nancial markets in combination with discretionary monetary
policy is su¢ cient to generate expectation traps, i.e. multiple policy equilibria which are
associated with di¤erent volatilities of all macroeconomic variables. Our results are not
restricted to this simple model, but will also prevail in more detailed settings. Both assump-
tions incomplete nancial markets and discretionary monetary policy are justiable for
developing countries: Such countries have restricted access to international nancial mar-
kets and the ability of policymakers to precommit to future policies is generally weaker
than in developed countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section presents the
model. Section 3.1 discusses the policy equilibria for an ination targeting regime and
Section 3.2 discusses them under nominal exchange rate targeting. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model Highlights
We use a workhorse small open economy model, based on Galí and Monacelli (2005) and
De Paoli (2009), with incomplete nancial markets as in Benigno (2009). Specically, there
are two countries: the small open economy (Home) and the rest of the world (Foreign).
The size of the Home economy is innitely small relative to the size of the Foreign econ-
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omy, therefore the economic performance and policy decisions do not have any impact on
the rest of the world. Each economy is populated by innity-living households and rms.
Householdsconsume two goods, home- and foreign-produced, and their preferences reect
home bias in consumption. The law of one price holds. Firms are monopolistically com-
petitive, and only use labor to produce di¤erentiated tradable goods. Production takes
place in two stages. First, there is a continuum of intermediate goods rms, which produce
a di¤erentiated input. In the second stage nal goods producers combine these inputs into
output and sell them to households in both countries. Monopolistic competition and sticky
prices give a meaningful role for monetary policy. Each country has an independent scal
authority, which nances spending by distortionary taxes and bonds. Home bonds are not
tradable and in zero net supply, while foreign bonds are internationally tradable. Financial
markets are incomplete, and the portfolio allocation is determined by transaction costs.
All prots received by home country rms and nancial intermediaries are rebated to home
households. The Home country is subject to cost-push shocks. Full details of underlying
microfoundations of the model are given in Appendix A. In the following we present only
the linearized equations.6
2.1 Private Sector Equilibrium
The household optimization problem for the small open economy H yields a consumption
Euler equation
c^t = Etc^t+1 + 

EtS^t+1   S^t

   (^{t   EtHt+1) ; (1)
where c^t denotes consumption, S^t is the terms of trade (relative price of foreign producer
price in terms of home producer price), ^Ht is Home producer price ination and {^t is the
6We linearize the model around the unique zero-ination e¢ cient steady state, see Appendix A.
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short term nominal interest rate.7 Parameter  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution and  is the degree of trade openness:
The rmsoptimization problem gives the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve for
the producer price ination
^Ht = ^t +

1 + 
l

 S^t + 1

c^t +

&   
l


y^t +
 l

g^t

+ Et^Ht+1; (2)
where y^t is output, g^t is government spending, nanced by distortionary taxes, and ^t is
an AR(1) Home cost-push shock. Parameter & is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply and  = 
 1 is a monopolistic markup which is related to the elasticity of
substitution between home goods : Parameter  denotes the household discount factor
and the slope of the Phillips curve  = (1  ) (1  ) = is a function of the Calvo (1983)
probability of price change . Finally, parameter  l is the steady state value of the labour
income tax. The Home country maintains a balanced budget, so the e¤ect of marginal cost
on ination is scaled by the factor 1=

1 + 
l


.
The aggregate resource constraint can be written as
y^t = (1  ) c
y
c^t + 

(1  ) c
y
+
c
y

S^t + 
c
y
c^t +
g
y
g^t: (3)
where c^t is Foreign consumption. Parameter  is the elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods.
For the other, large and e¤ectively closed economy, the corresponding equations are
c^t = Etc^t+1   
 
{^t   EtFt+1

; (4)
y^t =
c
y
c^t +
g
y
g^t ; (5)
7Here and below, hatted variables indicate that they have been linearized relative to their steady states.
Steady state variables are denoted by letters without time subscript.
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^Ft = 

1

c^t + &y^

t +
 l

^ lt

+ EtFt+1; (6)
bTt = %{^

t +
1


bTt 1   %^Ft +
g
y
g^t  
 l


^ lt +
1

c^t + (& + 1) y^

t +
 l

^ lt

; (7)
where bTt is normalized total real Foreign debt issued by the Foreign government and held
by Home and Foreign residents, parameter % = b
T
F
y .
Finally, the model is closed with the risk premium equation
{^t = {^

t + EtHt+1   Et^Ft+1 + EtS^t+1   S^t   

bt +  (1  ) S^t

; (8)
the current account equation
0 =


c
y
y
y
(1   (1  ))  c

y
   (1  )

St + 
c
y
y
y
c^t + bt   bt 1 (9)
 c

y
c^t   {^t + ^Ft
and the denition of nominal exchange rate E^t
E^t = S^t   P^Ht + P^ Ft; (10)
where  is a Home portfolio adjustment cost parameter,  = bF
y is a measure of Foreign
debt held by non-residents in the steady state.
The system of ten equations (1)-(10) describes the private sector equilibrium and de-
termines c^t; y^t; ^Ht; bt; bTt ; c^

t ; y^

t ; ^

Ft; E^t and S^t; given the policy variables {^t; {^

t ; g^t; g^

t ; ^
l
t :
2.2 Small Open Economy Model in LQ Policy Framework
In the following we will only consider the dynamics of the small open economy and treat
all variables of the large closed economy as exogenous shocks. Hence, we only work with
the system of equations (1)-(3) and (8)-(10). Endogenous variables are c^t; y^t; ^Ht; bt; E^t
and S^t, the policy instrument is {^t. The cost push shock ^t as well as government spending
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g^t is treated as exogenous. System (4)-(7) determines other exogenous processes c^t ; y^

t ;
^Ft; b
T
t ; {^

t ; g^

t ; ^
l
t :
System (1)-(3), (8)-(10) can be represented in the following form, suitable for standard
policy analysis in the linear-quadratic (LQ) framework. For convenience we introduce a
new variable
ut = c^t    (1  ) S^t (11)
which measures the excess consumption under incomplete nancial markets, as ut  0
under international risk sharing. Substituting out consumption and the interest rate (using
equation (8)), the consumption Euler equation can be re-written as
ut = Etut+1 + 

bt +  (1  ) S^t

    {^t   ^Ft+1 : (12)
The Phillips curve becomes
^Ht = ^t +


1 + (&  H)

( (1  ) + ) (1  ) c
y
+  c

y


1 + g
y
 S^t (13)
+


1

+

&   g
y

(1  ) c
y


1 + g
y
 ut
+


&   g
y

 c

y
c^t +
g
y

& + 1  g
y

g^t


1 + g
y
 + Et^Ht+1
and the current account equation is given by
bt =
1

bt 1 +
1


(1  )+ 

c
y
   (1  (   ) (1  )) c
y
y
y

St (14)
 

c
y
y
y
ut +
1



c
y
c^t +  ({^

t   ^Ft)

:
In the following we will treat the terms of trade S^t as policy instrument, as it only enters
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contemporaneously in equations (12)-(14).8 The three endogenous variables in system (12)-
(14) are the foreign debt bt; producer-price ination ^Ht and excess consumption ut. Once
this system is solved, the interest rate needed to deliver the optimal policy can be found
from (8), consumption can be recovered from equation (11) and output can be found from
the aggregate demand equation (3).
2.3 Monetary Policy Regimes
2.3.1 Ination Targeting
In this paper we assume that the following quadratic policy objective is delegated to the
central bank by either society or legislation (see e.g. Kam et al. (2009)):
W ITt =
1
2
Et
1X
s=t
s tm
 
2H;s + !yy^
2
s

; (15)
where m is monetary policymakers discount factor. The above policy objective has been
shown by Woodford (2003) to approximate the aggregate of individual utility functions in a
closed economy model with complete nancial markets. In our model, this approximation
will not hold up to the second order, but is frequently considered in the literature as a
likely objective given to the central bank. Where relevant, this policy objective also plays
the role of social loss, so all welfare losses are computed using metric (15).9
2.3.2 Nominal Exchange Rate Targeting
Under nominal exchange rate targeting the central bank uses the following objective
WEt =
1
2
Et
1X
s=t
s tm

(1  !e)
 
2H;s + !yy^
2
s

+ !eE^
2
s

; (16)
8This approach is common in the literature, see Clarida et al. (1999) where consumption is treated
as policy instrument and the interest rate is later reinstated from the Euler equation. Our approach is
similar. Once the solution is found, the interest rate can be reinstated from the risk premium equation.
9Appendix B provides the robustness analysis to this form of policy objective.
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where we impose an additional weight !e on the stabilisation of the nominal exchange rate
around its steady state value.
If !e = 0 then the objective (16) reduces to the standard ination targeting regime
(15). If !e = 1 then the objective (16) is equivalent to a strict exchange rate targeting
regime:
WE1t =
1
2
Et
1X
s=t
s tm E^
2
s : (17)
This targeting regime has some similarities with a xed exchange rate regime. In particular,
this regime assumes that the policy maker announces the target, perhaps within a corridor
(which we do not model as binding in any way, so it does not a¤ect expectations of the
private sector) and implements policy to keep the exchange rate on target. The exchange
rate, however, is allowed to deviate from the target, although such deviations are costly.10
2.3.3 Policy, Policy Instrument and Solution
The central bank manipulates the short term interest rate to a¤ect the terms of trade S^
to minimise loss (15) (or (16)) subject to system(12)-(14). A discretionary solution can be
written in the form of linear feedback rules
bt = byyt +bxxt; (18)
ut = uyyt + uxxt; (19)
^H;t = yyt + xxt; (20)
S^t = syyt + sxxt (21)
where vector yt denotes the vector of endogenous predetermined states, and vector xt
denotes the vector of exogenous predetermined states. In case of ination targeting vector
10The peg is softas it is a result of optimisation policy and so is di¤erent from a hardpeg where the
monetary policy maker is prepared to sell any quantity of reserves at a given price to keep the exchange rate
exactly on target. A hard peg cannot be modeled within our framework of optimisation with a quadratic
loss function because any regime with quadratic loss function allows (costly) deviations from the parity.
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yt = [bt 1] is a scalar, while in case of nominal exchange rate targeting it is yt = [pHt 1; bt 1]:
Vector xt contains the stochastic component of the solution xITt = [^t] for all policy regimes
we consider.11 A representation in the form of (18)-(21)is conveniant to illustrate the
multiplicity of discretionary equilibria.
2.4 Calibration
The share of government spending to GDP, g=y and g=y; is set to 0.20 for each country.
We set ! = bF
bTF
= 0:0 as the small open economy is unlikely to be a substantial non-resident
holder of the large countrys debt. We set % = b
T
F
y = 0:6  4 which reects a 60% annual
debt to output ratio. Calibration of parameters g=y, g=y; % and ! yields the steady state
tax level needed to service debt 
l

= g
y
and 
l

= g

y + % (1  ) :Finally, we calibrate the
adjustment cost parameter  = 0:01 following Benigno (2009). This implies a 10 basis point
spread of the domestic interest rate over the foreign one. We assume that the policymakers
discount factor m = :
The calibration of structural parameters is standard. The model frequency is quarterly.
The households discount factor  is set to 0.99 which gives the steady state interest rate of
4% and the Calvo parameter  is set to 0.75 which implies the average length of xed price
contracts of about one year. Openness is set to  = 0:3. The inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity is calibrated  = 0:5; based on evidence in Attanasio and Weber (1995). The
elasticity between home goods  = 11 and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour
supply  = 3 are calibrated consistently with most estimations of DSGE models (Liu and
Mumtaz (2011), Justiniano and Preston (2010), Chen et al. (2013)). The intertemporal
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods  is set to 1.5, see Albonico
11Coe¢ cients b; u; ; s can be found by solving the rst order conditions. Our denition of discretion is
conventional, see e.g Clarida et al. (1999). We present the general discretionary problem in LQ models
in Appendix E.
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et al. (2016) and Adolfson et al. (2008). Finally, following Galí and Monacelli (2005) cost
push shocks in the domestic country and the rest of the world follow AR(1) processes with
persistence parameter 

= 0:4. The standard deviation of a cost push shock is 0:005. We
only consider one shock in our welfare computations, as this does not a¤ect any of our
results. Adding more shocks simply rescales the loss numbers in a not-informative way.
3 Discretionary Policy and Expectations Traps
In this section we demonstrate that expectation traps are relevant for a monetary policy-
maker in a small open economy. We rst consider standard ination targeting policy. To
stabilise ination, the policymaker must choose a plan how quickly to bring the marginal
costs back to their steady state level. The policymaker may be expected to stabilise mar-
ginal costs slower or faster, and multiple equilibria arise. Similarly, under soft exchange
rate targeting, di¤erent speeds of stabilization of the nominal exchange rate is possible.
3.1 Ination Targeting
Table 1 reports that the model exhibits three discretionary equilibria under ination tar-
geting, which we label A, B, and C.
Table 1 shows that equilibria A and B share certain characteristics while equilibrium
C appears very di¤erent.12 In particular, the feedback coe¢ cients on ination, terms of
trade and the nominal interest rate in equilibrium C are all much larger in magnitude
than those for equilibria A and B, suggesting greater volatility in a stochastic economy.
In addition, while the nominal interest rate is lowered in response to higher foreign assets
in equilibria A and B it is raised markedly in equilibrium C. These three equilibria
produce qualitatively and quantitatively di¤erent economic dynamics, as shown in Figure
12The loss is measured in percentage of steady state consumption which needs to be sacriced to eliminate
stochastic volatility.
12
Table 1: Multiple Discretionary Equilibria under Ination Targeting
Policy Private sector Implied response Speed of Value Average
Eqm. Reaction Reaction of interest rate adjustment function Loss
[sb]

ub
b

[ib] max [V ] L;%C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A  0:1106

0:1013
0:0008

 0:0036 0:9534 8:9e-05 0.0166
B  0:1258

0:0950
 0:0867

 0:0856 0:9505 0:0713 0.0715
C  3:1888

0:0004
 0:8100

2:8586 0:0824 0:7127 0.4498
1 which plots the responses of key variables to a one-percent domestic mark up shock. To
understand these results, and also to provide an intuition for the rise of mulitiplicity, we
look closer at the transmission mechanism of shocks under optimal discretionary policy.
Monetary policy aims to stabilize ination and does it via inuencing the path for
marginal cost. The forward representation of the Phillips curve (13) can be written as
^H;t = Et
1X
s=t
s tm^cs +
1
1  
^t; (22)
where the real marginal costs can be expressed as13
m^cs = w1S^t + w2 (bt 1   bt) + w3"d;t: (23)
It is apparent that movements in mct and mct+1 are highly substitutable in terms of their
e¤ect on Ht and that there are multiple paths for mct that will return ination to target.
These di¤erent paths for real marginal costs are associated with di¤erent monetary policies
13Parameters w1 > 0; w2 > 0; w3 and the composite shock "d;t are given in Appendix C.
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and with di¤erent performances in terms of the loss. Equation (23) shows that monetary
policy can a¤ect mct through two distinct channels. The standard response to lower
marginal cost is to tighten monetary policy. In our case this means an improvement in
the terms of trade, as w1 > 0 in equation (23). Households will respond by reducing
consumption and selling foreign assets as the terms of trade drive the evolution of net
foreign assets in equation (14). Alternatively, the policy maker can conduct expansionary
monetary policy which implies a depreciation of the terms of trade, but also causes net
foreign assets to accumulate.
The key for multiplicity is that the impact of S^t and bt on m^ct is in opposite directions.
Notice that a reduction in S^t causes a fall in bt and that S^t and bt have countervailing
e¤ects on m^ct. As a consequence, the desirability of each policy from the perspective of
the period-t policymaker turns on how future policymakers are expected to respond to
movements in the stock of net foreign assets.
Consider the case where future policymakers are expected to lower the interest rate
and depreciate the terms of trade in response to a rise in the stock of net foreign assets.
Following a positive cost push shock ^t, the current policy of raising the real interest
rate and causing S^t and bt to decline will successfully deliver lower real marginal costs
and ination because the boost in future real marginal costs caused by the decline in
the stock of net foreign assets is o¤set by lower terms of trade in the future. Under
this approach, monetary policy responds to the positive markup shock by contracting
demand, lowering real marginal costs and ination, and next by lowering interest rates
and increasing the terms of trade as ination declines allowing the economy to recover,
producing an equilibrium. Alternatively, if future policymakers are expected to raise the
interest rate and reduce the terms of trade in response to a higher stock of net foreign
assets, then a current policy that lowers the real interest rate and raises the terms of trade
14
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Figure 1: Ination Targeting
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can bring about a decline in ination by stimulating the accumulation of foreign assets.
This is despite the boost to S^t and mct today, because future policymakers respond to the
higher foreign assets by tightening monetary policy, producing another equilibrium.
This is exactly what Panel I of Figure 1 illustrates. As anticipated, we nd that the
behaviour of the economy is notably di¤erent in equilibria A (and B) and C. In equilibrium
C monetary policy accommodates cost-push shocks, but allows to bring the stock of assets
back to the base line quickly. The tight monetary policy in equilibrium A (and B) results
in a large reduction in the net foreign assets position with small but long-lasting e¤ects on
all macroeconomic variables.
These three equilibria are obtained numerically by searching for a x-point in the poli-
cymakers response to the stock of foreign assets and plotted in Panel II of Figure 1. Given
a perceived policy reaction function (21) with feedback sib we can compute the optimal
reaction of the private sector (uib; 
i
b) in (19)-(20) by solving for the rational expectations
solution of system (12)(14). The solution is unique for a wide range of specications of
the model. Given the reaction of the private sector (uib; 
i
b), we can solve the maximisation
problem of the central bank to nd the best policy response, si+1b : As the objective func-
tion is concave the solution is unique. In points where si+1b = s
i
b we have a discretionary
equilibrium. There are three such points in Panel II of Figure 1. All three equilibria are
private-sector learnable, but only equilibria A and C are jointly learnable, as discussed in
Dennis and Kirsanova (2017). This implies that conventional methods of nding discre-
tionary solution by backwards induction (Oudiz and Sachs, 1985) can only nd equilibria
A and C.
The discovered equilibria are robust to di¤erent calibrations of the model. Changes in ;
' and bH=y result in minor shifts of points of intersection in Panel II Figure 1, preserving
qualitative di¤erences in the dynamics of the di¤erent equilibria. The intermediation cost
16
parameter  does not a¤ect equilibria in a signicant way either. With  tending to zero
transaction costs fall and the degree of nancial integration rises. All three equilibria
survive for any  > 0:14 However, there is a discontinuity at  = 0; where the problem is
isomorphic to the one under international risk sharing, with private sector investing into
state-contingent assets and one-period foreign bonds is one of them. A unique discretionary
equilibrium with properties similar to those in equilibrium C can be obtained analytically
(see Appendix D). Equilibria A and B correspond to a single solution with zero feedback
of all control variables on net foreign assets, producing explosive dynamics of the economy,
and are ruled out as discretionary equilibria by transversality conditions.15
Can the multiplicity be eliminated by delegating a particular policy objective to the
policymaker? The answer is positive, and many such delegation schemes may exist. How-
ever, they do not necessarily result in higher overall welfare. For example, the intrinsic
property of equilibrium C is that it implies a relatively fast adjustment of the endoge-
nous predetermined state, foreign assets. Making the fast adjustment costly may help to
eliminate this equilibrium. Panel III in Figure 1 illustrates a policy delegation where the
policymaker minimises the loss with an additional penalty on changes in net foreign asset
position
W IT;bt =
1
2
Et
1X
s=t
s tm
 
2H;s + !yy^
2
s + !b (bt   bt 1)2

: (24)
Panel III demonstrates that with !b > 0 the line si+1b (s
i
b) shifts up, so points C and B
eventually disappear, once !b is su¢ ciently large. However, this policy results in substantial
welfare losses in the now equilibrium A. For our base line calibration, !b ' 32 results in
an average loss of 0.4549, which is slightly greater than loss of now eliminated equilibrium
14Checked numerically up to values  = 1e-8:
15In this model we consider government debt. The results are una¤ected by the debt ownership structure.
Assuming that the foreign debt is privately-issued and its net supply is zero, would only a¤ect exogenous
processes.
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C and substantially greater than the loss in equilibrium A with !b = 0; see column (7) in
Table 1.
Table 2: E¤ect of Discounting under Ination Targeting
m 0.99 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0
A 0.0166 0.0166 0.0166 0.0166 0.0166 0.0166 0.0166
C 0.4498 0.4499 0.4502 0.4512 0.4566 0.4751 
In contrast to the policy delegation scheme discussed in (24), the loss in the best
equilibrium is una¤ected if the monetary policymaker is impatient, m < ; see Table 2
which reports the losses in equilibria A and C for di¤erent discount factors m:
16 Once the
policymaker discounts the future at a su¢ ciently high rate (m  0:08 for the base line
calibration), only the best equilibrium A survives.17 Equilibrium C relies on the ability of
the policymaker to delay stabilisation of ination until future periods, which is ruled out
by impatience. Table 2 demonstrates, however, that the loss in the worst equilibrium C
increases with the degree of impatience, and an inability to choose the right discounting
may result in a substantially worse outcome.
3.2 Exchange Rate Targeting
Unlike ination targeting, discretionary policy can be consistent with keeping the nominal
exchange rate on target at all times.18 If the policy maker targets the nominal exchange
16This result is conditional on the form of the objective function. The above objective function contains
only forward-looking terms. Had we for example kept the change in NFA as a target, the loss in both
equilibria would change with discounting. However, for illustrative purposes we report the result for the
standard ination targeting regime. Here and below we use the socialobjective with discount factor  to
calculate the loss.
17Numerical simulations produce a picture which is qualitatively similar to Panel 3 in Figure III.
18Much of NOEM literature (see e.g. Galí and Monacelli (2005)) demonstrates that it is possible under
interest rate rules.
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rate, complete stabilization can be achieved. However, this equilibrium is not unique and
the policymaker may not be able to achieve complete stabilisation of the nominal exchange
rate.
The intuition for this result is similar to the one presented above. Exchange rate
targeting requires to stabilise prices of foreign goods. We can rewrite
E^t = PF;t   P t = S^t + PH;t   P t = S^t + H;t + PH;t 1   P t
= S^t + Et
1X
s=t
s tm^cs +
1
1  
t + PH;t 1   P t ;
which is similar to representation (22). Therefore, there is no surprise that we have several
paths for marginal costs each of which eventually stabilises the nominal exchange rate.
Figure 2 demonstrates the responses to a domestic cost push shock in two discretionary
equilibria labelled A and C.19 Responses are qualitatively similar to corresponding equilib-
ria under ination targeting plotted in Figure 1, Panel I. However, there are quantitative
di¤erences. In equilibrium A the policymaker reduces the terms of trade as little as needed
to generate a small negative e¤ect of marginal costs on ination to match the increase in
home price with the reduction in the terms of trade to keep the nominal exchange rate
exactly on target. In this equilibrium ination rises by much more than under ination
targeting in Figure 1, and this results in relatively large welfare losses, see Table 3.
In equilibrium C the policymaker lowers the interest rate sharply. The nominal ex-
change rate depreciates and is not kept on target. Nevertheless, this is a discretionary
equilibrium consistent with the stabilization of the nominal exchange rate, as the policy-
maker is still able to keep the nominal exchange rate stable on averagein response to a
positive cost push shock. As soon as the private sector expects that future policymakers
19To obtain these equilibria we used the standard way of backwards induction (Oudiz and Sachs 1985).
It allows us to obtain equilibria which are jointly learnable, see Dennis and Kirsanova (2017). Iterations
on policy reaction are not applicable, as we have more than one endogenous state variable. However, the
discovered two equilibria are su¢ cient to illustrate multiplicity of equilibria.
19
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Figure 2: Soft Exchange Rate Targeting
would raise the interest rate and reduce the terms of trade in response to a higher stock
of net foreign assets, the current policymaker lowers the interest rate, raises the terms of
trade and therefore stimulates an accumulation of foreign assets. It, therefore, delivers
the expected future policy response, and validates the expectations of the private sector.
The stabilisation is costly, as the volatility of all variables is substantial. However, this
strategy is consistent with the soft exchange rate target as it ensures the convergence back
towards the target in the medium term, see Figure 2. In other words, as it is less costly
to validate the expectations of the private sector than to accommodate them, the policy-
maker is trapped in this equilibrium. Similar to the ination targeting regime the targeted
variable is allowed to deviate from the target, and the current policymaker perceives that
the private sector expects future policymakers to appreciate the nominal exchange rate, it
will optimally choose to generate a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate today.
20
Table 3: Multiple Discretionary Equilibria under Strict Exchange Rate Targeting
Policy Private sector Implied response Speed of Average
Eqm. Reaction Reaction of interest rate adjustment Loss

sp sd
  up ud
p d
 
ip id

max L;%C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A

-0.6038 -0.0409
  -0.0462 0.1062
-0.3962 0.0409
 
0.0027 -0.0097

0.9532 0.1209
C

0.6537 -2.7121
  0.0064 -0.0053
0.0118 -0.8257
 
-0.4247 1.0971

0.6231 0.5437
Table 4: Multiplicity under Exchange Rate Targeting
!e 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.05 0.02 0.0
A 0.1209 0.1195 0.1171 0.1126 0.1006 0.0588 0.0328 0.0166
C 0.5437 0.5429 0.5417 0.5394 0.5336 0.5161 0.5087 0.4498
Multiplicity is also preserved in the more general form of exchange rate targeting using
the hybrid objective (16). Table 4 reports losses for intermediate values of the relative
weight on the exchange rate target !e 2 (0; 1]. If !e = 0 the objective (16) coincides with
ination targeting objective (15). The losses in equilibria with !e > 0 are higher than
under ination targeting.
Multiplicity, however, is eliminated if the policymaker is impatient. Equilibrium C
arises as there is a possibility to stabilise the exchange rate tomorrow. Table 5 reports
our results of reducing the policymakers discount factor, m in the objective (17). Once
it is su¢ ciently small (m . 0:03) the stable inferior equilibrium disappears.20 The best
20This result was obtained numerically. Appendix F demonstrates that for m = 0 the nominal exchange
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Table 5: E¤ect of Discounting under Exchange Rate Targeting
m 0.99 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.05 0.03 0.0
A 0.1209 0.1209 0.1209 0.1209 0.1209 0.1209 0.1209 0.1209
C 0.5437 0.5478 0.6038 0.8907 1.2740 1.6124 1.6608 
equilibrium is invariant to m:
Despite it is commonly suggested that currency pegging is an e¢ cient way to import
low and stable ination, it is apparent that in the case of a soft pegthe implied volatility
of the nominal exchange rate and domestic ination in the worst regime is higher than
it is in the case of ination targeting. This is not surprising: these are two second-best
scenarios, and there cannot be any a priori ranking between them.
4 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates how multiple equilibria can occur in a small open economy model
with incomplete nancial markets under discretionary monetary policy. As current poli-
cymakers cannot control the behaviour of future policymakers nor the expectation of the
private sector coordination failures and expectation traps can occur. In our model policy
makers need to decide if the economy should be stabilized today or at some point in the
future.
We believe that the presented model is capable of explaining recent empirical evidence
on exchange rate behaviour: there can be switches between policy regimes that are char-
acterized by changes in the volatility of the nominal exchange rate. This can happen
for a wide and realistic class of policy objectives, as long as the policy maker acts under
discretion and there is at least one predetermined state variable in the system.
rate is always kept on target.
22
Although the presented model is highly stylised, and bringing it to the data is therefore
beyond the scope of this paper, a su¢ ciently complex model with these features will retain
multiplicity of equilibria and should be able to replicate the observed volatilities of key
macroeconomic variables, in particular the nominal exchange rate.
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